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Chapter 5
Terror, Law, and Torture
The United States of America has always been a torturing state, but it has professionally institutionalized the practice only recently. Its 
political leaders offer denials, but blatant practices and tortuous legal 
arguments make the denials oxymoronic. The history of torture by the 
United States supports a more general theoretical proposition: the more 
states legislate against terrorism, the more likely they will use torture as an 
instrument of terror. Other examples of this proposition include Britain in 
Northern Ireland, Russia in Chechnya, and of course Nazi Germany. Terror 
legislation and torture can accompany an imperialist effort or internal 
national security regimes to suppress dissent. Both motives apply in the 
case of the United States. 
The recent development of torture falls into three stages. After the 
Second World War, the United States assembled torture expertise and 
apparatus in line with a national security ideology springing from the 
anti-Communist crusade. In a backlash against liberation and equality 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, crime hysteria led to criminal justice 
restructuring beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing into the twenty-
first century. Often described as a turn toward punitiveness, crime hysteria 
and control prepared the United States institutionally and its people ideo-
logically to embark on its current course of terror law and torture.
The U.S. torture regime depends on basic structural characteristics of 
American society, especially its racism and competitive and individualistic 
capitalism. These in turn give a particular character to its imperial expan-
sion and assertions of world hegemony. Imperialism is central, so is rac-
ism. They are intertwined in the Anglophone history of colonialism, but 
imperialism and racism so often go together, especially since the advent of 
European imperialism in the late fifteenth century, as to make their pair-
ing a general rule. At the same time, the United States has countervailing 
institutions: most prominently, its historical commitment to democracy, 
equality, and protection of laws.
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Expansion of U.S. hegemony after the Second World War, and again 
after the fall of the USSR and Eastern Bloc, put special demands on the 
U.S. polity. Ruling classes and power elites faced a pressing need. As rec-
ognized at least since the time of Metternich and Talleyrand (Kissinger 
1964), expansion of influence and control beyond state borders requires 
a compliant, if not docile, domestic populace. Dangerous classes must be 
controlled, especially when, as seemed imminent in 1968, they threaten 
the status quo of wealth, privilege, and power. The United States used 
the criminal justice system to control the domestic dangerous classes and 
counterinsurgency tactics including torture to control foreigners.
The History of U.S. Torture
It was not that state agents did not torture before the end of the Second 
World War, but the torturers were agents of local governments and the 
several states of the union. There was no national policy of torture. Settlers 
and soldiers routinely tortured Native Americans (Churchill 1997; Slotkin 
1985). Slave owners tortured slaves, and after 1865, racial lynching often 
included torture before the coup de grace (Waldrep 2002). Police regularly 
used the third degree to extract confessions and information. They also 
punished miscreants by physical abuse, either in lieu of arrest or prior 
to it. Convicts in state penitentiaries often suffered abuse. Federal police 
and correctional agencies, if they did employ the use of torture, did so 
covertly. Beginning in 1936 with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Mississippi (1936), federal courts increasingly intervened in state 
criminal justice systems to curtail official torture. During the Second 
World War, in the Pacific theater, but rarely in the European theater, units 
of the U.S. military used torture against Japanese soldiers as part of the 
overall brutalization of what both sides viewed as a racial war (Horne 
2005). Nonetheless, torture was not national policy, even covertly.
As the war in Europe wound down, overtures between Nazi leaders 
and U.S. intelligence operatives such as Allen Dulles in the OSS (Office 
of Strategic Services) set the stage for acquiring German expertise; opera-
tions Overcast and Paperclip resulted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized 
Operation Overcast 6 July, 1945, to bring German scientists to the United 
States, despite possible past membership in the Nazi Party and the SS. 
In September 1946 President Truman directed bringing various desired 
specialists to the United States in an operation called Paperclip. Some of 
the experts were accused of participating in murderous medical experi-
ments on human subjects at concentration camps and brutalizing slave 
laborers (Simpson 1988:36). Between 1945 and 1955, the United States 
welcomed 765 German specialists, of whom perhaps 80 percent were Nazi 
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Party members or SS veterans (Lasby 1975). Some became well known. 
Werner von Braun appeared on the Walt Disney TV program in the 
1950s, for example. Others remained in shadow; among them were those 
employed in mind control and interrogation techniques.
In April 1950, the CIA launched Operation Bluebird to discover 
more effective interrogation techniques. Boris Pash—an anticommunist 
since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, counterintelligence chief for the 
Manhattan Project, and recruiter of German specialists in Operation 
Paperclip—reviewed Nazi techniques for use in the Cold War (McCoy 
2006:26–7; Simpson 1988). By April 1953, the CIA unified various mind 
control and interrogation researches into MKUltra under the direction 
of Sidney Gottlieb of its Technical Services Division. Gottlieb reported 
directly to Chief of Operations Richard Helms, who later became CIA 
director. The sensory deprivation experiments by Donald O. Hebb, a 
Canadian psychological researcher, caught the eye of Gottlieb. A few years 
later, more research at Harvard found that sensory deprivation causes 
unbearable stress, which progressively leads to hallucinations and delu-
sions (Wexler et al. 1958). Next, a Princeton psychologist, Jack A. Vernon, 
received lavish funding from the Army and National Science Foundation 
to pursue this line of research with the view to applying it to interroga-
tion. Vernon noted that physical violence is often counterproductive, but 
sensory deprivation could be an effective tool for extracting compliance, 
dependence, and information (Vernon 1963). Whereas Vernon’s stated 
intentions seem benign—he ends his book on sensory deprivation by 
recommending everyone try it to better appreciate the small things in 
life—the CIA had applications that were more dubious.
In 1963, the same year Vernon published his book on sensory depri-
vation, the CIA wrote the Kubark Counterintelligence manual. Originally 
secret, leaks and successful FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) struggles 
have made it readily available on the Internet. The Web site post, “Prisoner 
Abuse: Patterns from the Past,” by the National Security Archive links to a 
wealth of information on the topic and related matters.
Kubark defined CIA interrogation methods for the next forty years, 
until the photographs from Abu Ghraib forced worldwide exposure. 
Kubark premises its techniques for interrogation on inducing regression. 
Interrogators create existential chaos from the moment of arrest (McCoy 
2006:51). The essence of effective interrogation—civil police questioning, 
military field interrogation of POWs, and even for clandestine work—is to 
make the subject want to tell the interrogator the desired information. That 
objective is best reached by creating dependence on the interrogator. While 
it can be achieved by physical violence, resistance or false compliance is 
also possible. False compliance occurs when the subject says  whatever 
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seems necessary to stop the pain. Psychological torture is more likely to 
produce reliable, if not always accurate, information. Of course, reliable 
information comes from a sincere but not necessarily well-informed 
subject. McCoy (2006:53) points out another advantage to psychological 
torture. It leaves none of the usual signs, and thus eludes the strictest 
human rights protections.
Having given up on drugs such as LSD, electroshock, psychosurgery, 
and similar invasive techniques, Kubark reflects the distillation of research 
since the end of the Second World War. Once set down in the Kubark 
manual, the CIA lost no time in exporting the expertise to Cold War allies. 
Britain used some of them against Northern Ireland guerrillas. Among 
them are what came to be called the five techniques. They are as follows. 
 1. Wall standing: forcing detainees to remain in stress positions;
 2. Hooding: keeping a light-resistant bag or hood over the detainees’ 
heads;
 3. Noise: subjection to continuous loud noises;
 4. Sleep deprivation; 
 5. Reduced diet (Ireland v. United Kingdom 1978:96, pp. 35–36) 
These are the same techniques applied to Jose Padilla, who also avers 
that he was given mind-altering drugs, possibly LSD or PCP (Gerstein 
2006; Hegarty 2007). Ireland complained to the European Human Rights 
Commission against British use of such tactics. The Commission issued 
its 8,400-page report finding that the five techniques were torture. When 
the complaint proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights, the 
British Attorney General assured the Court that “The Government of 
the United Kingdom . . . now give[s] this unqualified undertaking, that 
the “five techniques” will not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an 
aid to interrogation” (Ireland v. United Kingdom 102, p. 36). This became, in 
effect, a consent decree. Britain promised not to do it again, and the Court 
found Britain not guilty of torture by a vote of thirteen to four, but only 
inhuman treatment, unanimously (Ireland v. United Kingdom, Holdings 
of the Court on Article 3, p. 86). The court later repudiated the principle 
in Selmouni v. France (Application no. 25803/94) July 28, 1999, where it 
found similar treatment to constitute torture. Although it may seem a 
distinction without a difference, the Ireland ruling looms large in current 
U.S. policies and practices of torture. It opened the door to making tor-
ture an ambiguous term. Its claimed ambiguity allows U.S. officials to aver 
that the United States does not torture. At the same time, the U.S. regime 
sought and got legislation that permits torture by assuring its secrecy and 
lack of legal recourse under the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
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The United States did not export the techniques outlined in Kubark 
only to its special ally and former world colonial power—Britain. It also 
disseminated them to countries that became the battlefield of the Cold 
War—that is, the Third World. Nowhere is this better documented than in 
Latin America (Chomsky and Herman 1979).
The Cuban Revolution of January 1959 and Khrushchev’s avowed sup-
port for wars of national liberation in January 1961 led the United States 
to view Latin America as the new battleground of the Cold War (Loveman 
and Davies 1997:20; Hilsman 1961; Rostow 1962). Soon after Khrushchev’s 
declaration, President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress as the 
U.S. response. The idea was to fight communism in two ways: counterin-
surgency and social support programs for the poor to make communism 
less attractive to them. The second method ensured the first. The Alliance 
for Progress raised expectations and threatened the local elites (Loveman 
and Davies 1997:23). Agitation by the masses led to crackdowns by Latin 
American governments. It also prompted large landowners and industrial-
ists to hire private militias. Both the masses and the elites began to believe 
that governments could no longer govern. These trends culminated in a 
series of right-wing coups typically led by elements of the military. The 
age of the junta was the fruit of the liberal program of anti-Communism 
in Latin America.
Brazil, in 1964, was the first (Archdiocese of São Paulo 1986). Others 
followed. Soon, military dictatorships ruled most of South America. They 
used torture freely to come to and keep power. Many of the torturers 
learned their trade at the School of the Americas run by the U.S. Army 
in Panama. Now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation, it moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1984. Prior to the U.S. 
Army taking over in 1963, it was the Latin American Ground School. Its 
purpose under all its names was to ensure U.S. influence among cadres of 
Latin American military, police, and state security officials. Kubark, its 1983 
update, Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual, and subsequent 
editions put out by the Army were standard textbooks for students at the 
School of the Americas. They were withdrawn in 1991 because of adverse 
publicity (Haugaard 1997). Under actual conditions, Latin American 
officials augmented the psychological techniques favored by the CIA with 
physical violence. One reason for the addition was that torture did not 
serve a purely interrogatory function. It was part of regimes of terror. The 
juntas used assassinations, death squads, disappearances, and even geno-
cide to rule the masses. These police state regimes made sure people knew 
they could expect torture if they came to the attention of the authorities.
Torture serves several purposes. Christopher Tindale (1996) identified 
a torture typology. Interrogational torture is used to extract information. 
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Deterrent torture discourages (or encourages) a population regarding cer-
tain activities. Dehumanizing torture changes the victim’s self-conception. 
For this last type—dehumanizing torture—Tindale adverts to Bruno 
Bettleheim (1979) and Primo Levi (1989), and their descriptions of the 
Nazi camps during the Second World War. Tindale explained that the 
purpose of dehumanizing torture is to “break people as individuals and 
change them into docile masses” (Tindale 1996: 351). His conception 
brings to mind the torture described in George Orwell’s 1984. Elaine Scarry 
noted that torture’s goal is betrayal as the torturer has “a covert disdain for 
confession.” Therefore, confession is not the goal, as “[t]he nature of confes-
sion is falsified . . . one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world—
friend, family, country, cause—that the self is made up of” (1985: 29).
Perhaps a fourth type, or possibly a combinatory category, is what Daniel 
Rothenberg calls “public presentational torture,” which he says is a form 
of state terrorism (Rothenberg 2003). His illustrative case is Guatemala, 
where a thirty-six-year history of internal armed conflict is called La 
Violencia. He couches the history in the Cold War and severe domestic 
inequity. Guatemala is one of the better-known targets of CIA intervention 
beginning with the regime change of President Arbenz in 1954. Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzman (1913–1971) served as president 1951–1954 through 
Guatemala’s first ever universal suffrage election. United Fruit enlisted the 
assistance of the CIA, which initiated Operation PBFORTUNE. Later, the 
United States supported a line of dictators by, inter alia, training police in 
counterinsurgency and torture techniques at the School of the Americas. 
A tactic of state forces was to leave mutilated corpses in public places.
Counter-insurgency strategies, including the “the appearance of corpses 
bearing signs of torture” defined a situation of brutal intimidation and 
overwhelming violence: “the horror was so massive and so flagrant that it 
defied the imagination.” The Guatemalan state’s reliance on institutional-
ized human rights violations became the central mechanism of daily rule.
 . . . 
[T]orture defines the most primary component of an individual—his 
or her body—as a site for state action. This is done against the will of the 
individual and in a manner that deprives him/her of the most basic respect 
for autonomy, freedom, and self-protection. . . . [T]orture turns responsible 
government on its head . . . the state is transformed from being the key 
guarantor of social stability to an agent of intimate brutality. 
(Rothenberg 2003:482)
What these displays left ambiguous was whether the person had been 
tortured or the body mutilated after death to suggest torture. In cases 
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of actual torture, the torturers might have sought information from the 
victim, but not necessarily. As Elizabeth Stanley (2004:13) says regarding 
another regime supported by the United States, Chile under Pinochet, 
Despite the common idea that torture is used solely as a means to extract 
information, Chilean torturers often knew all about their victims’ lives and 
used torture as a way to demonstrate the ‘all-seeing-eye’ and the power of 
the state. Officials engaged in torture to demonstrate to the victim and asso-
ciates that they are watching, that they are in charge and can act at will. 
This seems to have been the purpose at Abu Ghraib, because the torture 
revealed in the U.S. media in spring 2004 (Hersh 2004) was not part 
of interrogations. Erroll Morris’ documentary movie, Standard Operat-
ing Procedure (2008) shows the main objective was domination and 
humiliation.
The Domestic Groundwork for Abu Ghraib
Torture regimes do not fall from the sky. Modern mass societies do not 
allow their state apparatuses to do just any old thing, including torture. 
The political system need not be democratic. The Nazi regime, even in 
wartime, had to bow to public opinion when it stopped its euthanasia 
campaign (Friedlander 1995) and released Jewish husbands of “Aryan” 
wives (Stoltzfus 1996). 
The people have to be prepared. During the Cold War, the United 
States exported torture. It relied on proxy regimes to use the torture 
techniques they had learned from the United States. It tried to keep secret 
the pedagogical relation. In the last decades of the twentieth century, 
American public sensibilities changed. Mass incarceration, a policy of 
incapacitation, and increasingly punitive penal systems produced a public 
ready to consider, if not fully countenance, torture. As Ronald Crelinsten 
explained, “the torture regime must endeavor to ensure that it is reflected 
in all aspects of social and political life. . . . [T]he techniques used to train 
torturers . . . are but a reflection of a much wider process: the transforma-
tion of society” (2003:295).
An important part of transforming societies is transforming how 
people in those societies perceive them. How do Americans perceive 
America? How do they perceive one another? How do they perceive its 
main institutions? Before getting knee-deep in social-construction-of-
reality diversions (Berger and Luckmann 1966), it is useful to recall how 
Americans thought about the world—in say, 1945—and compare it 
to how they thought about it in 1950–1955. In a few years, and it took 
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longer for some than others, the people Americans wanted to slaughter 
in 1945—Germans and Japanese—became bosom buddies (or at least 
confederates in the case of Japanese). At the same time, those Russian pals, 
Chinese innocents, and Korean victims were out to get Americans. This 
did not occur as part of some inchoate groundswell, a mystical sea change 
in the conscience collectif. Deliberate public policies brought it about. There 
is an essential ingredient. “A central feature of this reality construction is 
the creation of a dangerous enemy that threatens the social fabric. Laws are 
directed against this enemy” (Crelinsten 2003:296). 
Beginning in 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency resonated 
with reassurance. He began his four terms in office with an inaugural 
address assuring Americans that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
After the Second World War, the preferred theme of political discourse 
shifted to inducing fear. The first project was the Cold War and Red Scare. 
Richard Nixon cobbled together the next project in his run for the presi-
dency in 1968. He made crime in the streets a campaign slogan. The slogan 
coded racial antagonisms, political dissent against the Vietnam War, and 
a raft of lifestyle images roughly conveyed by sex, drugs, and rock-n-roll. 
Although the drug war and crime control measures leveled off during the 
Carter administration, they came back with a vengeance under Reagan. 
During the entire period beginning in the late 1960s, a backlash mili-
tated against social changes connected to the extension of civil rights as 
a broadly construed concept. These include antidiscrimination laws and 
policies based on race, gender, age, and disabilities along with exposure 
and eventual reduction of repressive government tactics such as surveil-
lance and interference with political dissent. The backlash was a reaction 
that increasingly took the form of criminalizing deviant behavior.
David Altheide (2002) said fear is cumulatively integrated over time 
and in the process becomes associated with certain topics. Those topics are 
then associated with terms, as if there were an invisible hyphen. Eventually, 
the fear becomes implied and unstated. Altheide went on to link fear of 
crime with fear about major events, such as the 9/11 attacks. Especially 
since the mid 1960s, a growing fear linked outsiders and deviants to chal-
lenges to, and eventual loosening of formerly rock solid values and norms 
about, sex and gender, race, and America as the land of opportunity. 
A main part of the fear concerned crime. Specific discourses and public 
policies focused the unease arising from social change.
Over roughly the last thirty years, a discourse of fear in the United States 
has focused on crime. Such discourses trickle down from the top levels of 
ivory towers to popular culture outlets. They culminated in several books. 
Harvard academics such as James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrenstein 
(1985), revived a thinly disguised racist criminology rooted in a nineteenth 
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century vulgar Darwinism of Cesare Lombroso. Michael Gottfredson and 
Travis Hirschi (1990) tiptoe around a biological argument opting for par-
ent blaming instead. They asserted that parents are to blame for delinquent 
children, because they fail to instill self-control. The lack of self-control does 
not just manifest as law breaking. It includes other acts they say are equiva-
lent to crimes such as smoking, drinking, and out-of-wedlock sex and 
pregnancy. The resemblance to culture of poverty ideas of Oscar Lewis (1961 
and 1966) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965) is not happenstance.
Paralleling these pseudoscholarly discourses, public policy poured 
resources into policing, crime (especially drug control) proliferating 
criminal laws (especially federal crimes) (American Bar Association 1998), 
and incarceration (Mauer 2006). All the while, popular media kept pump-
ing up fear of criminals who were inevitably portrayed as impoverished 
minorities—the dangerous classes (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Best 1999; 
Glassner 1999; and Kappeler and Potter 2005). Two results follow that 
are essential for a regime of torture: first, acquiescent public opinion, and 
second, a supply of potential torturers. Physician and medical ethicist 
Steven Miles noted, “a torturing nation uses fear, persuasion, and pro-
paganda to secure the assent to torture from society in general and from 
members of its legal, academic, journalistic, and medical professions” 
(Miles 2006: xii). He went on to observe that “[m]oral responsibility in a 
torturing society is broadly shared” (p. 6).
In her critique of the ticking-time-bomb excuse for torture, Jessica 
Wolfendale (2006) pointed out that most torturers are soldiers or military 
police trained in elite units. Among Western imperialist states, she cites the 
British and Australian Special Air Services (SAS) and the U.S. Army’s Delta 
Force and Green Berets as illustrative. She explains that the basic training 
for such units includes brutalization, which inures the soldiers to their 
own suffering, and by the same token, that of others. Further, their train-
ing involves interrogation, survival, and resistance. Citing the Web site 
for the British SAS, http://geocities.com/sascenter/train.htm, Wolfendale 
explained that the training includes blindfolding, sleep deprivation, stress 
positions, reduced food and water, and noise, matching the “five tech-
niques” that the European Court of Human Rights found “inhuman.” 
Consequences for trainees are stressful and can produce mental disrup-
tion such as dissociation. Wolfendale cited the John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, http://training.sfahq.com.com/survival_
training.htm.
Torture also needs routinization, as Herbert Kelman (1993) called it. 
Torturers have to be socialized in the profession beyond learning particu-
lar torture techniques (Conroy 2000; Huggins et al 2002). Torture requires 
institutionalization, a network of organizations cooperating to share 
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information, methods, and personnel (Arrigo 2004). Cold War counter-
insurgency prepared the national military and intelligence apparatuses. 
Crime hysteria and the rise of a network of criminal justice apparatuses 
prepared public opinion. Both lead to social control of the nonmarginal 
parts of the populace as they prepare people to accept control and put con-
trol apparatuses in place (Chevigny 2003). Finally, the expansive criminal 
justice apparatuses created a pool of potential torturers. The crime control 
industry began growing by leaps and bounds in the 1970s (Chambliss 
1994; Christie 1993; Gordon 1990). The growth spurt had a reciprocal rela-
tion to political racial polarization (Beckett 1997; Edsall and Edsall 1991) 
Its model was Nixon’s Southern strategy engineered by Kevin Philipps 
(1969). It also managed to control a burgeoning pool of redundant work-
ers (Davey 1995; Parenti 1999). As the welfare apparatus shrank, crime 
control replaced informal social controls or capillary control mechanisms 
as Foucault put it (1975). Crime control drew down potentially dangerous 
concentrations of minority youths in central cities, removing them to pris-
ons in rural areas (Wacquant 2000). Perhaps the main contribution to con-
structing the professional institution of torture in the United States was the 
production of a supply of personnel trained and socialized to use force to 
control others. Most were relatively unskilled workers, the common labor-
ers in the vineyards of torture, such as Corporal Graner of Abu Ghraib 
infamy who had been a prison guard in civilian life (Williams 2006).
The Vietnam War ended in 1975, just about the time the crime control 
industry took off. The volunteer military replaced the draft, resulting in a 
self-selected cohort of youths who favored employment in total institu-
tions (Goffman 1961). The military, police, and corrections establishments 
crossrecruited, and their personnel entered revolving-door employment 
among the various uniformed organizations. A number of anecdotal 
accounts link employment in U.S. prisons with personnel assigned to pris-
ons in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gordon 2006; Finkel and Davenport 2004; 
Bastian et al. 2004). As yet, there is no systematic study of brutal practices 
in U.S. civilian law enforcement and corrections with torture in overseas 
operations. Nonetheless, Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler (1997) have 
studied one part of the obverse—the militarization of police. The central 
point is that police, prisons, and the military are all armed control organi-
zations. Their personnel are schooled in obedience. When their command-
ers expect or allow for brutality, they will produce it (Cornwell 2006).
Imperialism and Torture
The populism of fear is an enormously successful policy because it serves to 
intimidate and demonize some, and at the same time to discipline the rest 
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who are taught to be afraid of those demons. Since 11 September 2001, the 
focus has shifted toward international crime. It is easy to demonize foreign 
terrorists as criminals, to combine the fear of crime with the fear of the 
foreign invader. 
(Chevigny 2003:81)
Paul Chevigny’s analysis in the preceding quotation needs elaboration. 
The U.S. government mobilized popular fear against external and internal 
communists during the Cold War. The Nixon political machine mobilized 
and focused fear of crime by linking it to traditions of American racism 
and Puritanism. Ronald Reagan’s political ploy directed that racism and 
religious intolerance outward, toward so-called international terrorism 
in Iran and Lebanon, but he linked it to his determination to destroy the 
Soviet Union as the ultimate source of all terrorism (Evans and Novak 
1981; Wills 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union created a crisis in the 
U.S. national security state with its massive military and related industries. 
During the 1990s, the United States pursued a policy of gradualism in 
extending its hegemony. No one enemy could give it focus. For a while, 
international crime was a contender—as John Kerry argued in his 1997 
book, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens America’s Security. 
Four years later, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon rescued 
the U.S. security state from its doldrums.
Terrorism combines all the elements tapped by preceding governments. 
It has foreign and domestic enemies who are racially and religiously set 
off. The war on terrorism is both a military and internal security endeavor. 
The crime control apparatus can be folded into a Homeland Security 
Department to extend control over Chevigny’s demons and the mass of 
Americans. Anyone who has traveled by air since 9/11, has experienced 
the control firsthand. All this security tumult blurs the extension of U.S. 
imperialism. The target of that expansion has been central Asia. U.S. mili-
tary bases now dot southeastern Europe, which had been Soviet satellites, 
and new states surrounding the Caspian and Aral Seas, which had been 
part of the Soviet Union. Of course, the best known are the U.S. invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these imperialist forays are justified by the 
Global War on Terrorism.
The U.S. terror laws are linchpins articulating this global war on ter-
rorism. Imperialism is what connects them. The Global War on Terrorism 
was not inevitable. Without the attacks of 9/11, torture would still be 
covert and limited to a few selected individuals, the lumpen masses would 
still be fodder for the domestic crime control industry, U.S. imperial-
ism would still be extending global hegemony through neoliberal eco-
nomic institutions and collaborative but contained military intrusions 
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such as in the former Yugoslavia. But 9/11 did occur. The United States 
seconded by Britain and Australia—other countries participated because 
of arm-twisting and opportunism—embarked on a twenty-first century 
imperial expansion. Led by the United States, those countries generated 
mountains of terror legislation. U.S. terror legislation has added laws 
every year since the USA Patriot Act in November 2001. At the same 
time, the United States used torture immediately with almost punctili-
ous attention to legal justifications—for example the Yoo memoranda of 
September 25, 2001, January 9, 2002, and August 1, 2002; the Bybee 
memoranda of January 22, 7 February, and August 1, 2002; the Gonzales 
memorandum of January 25, 2002; and the Ashcroft memorandum of 
February 1, 2002 (Greenberg and Dratel 2005). U.S. forces tortured pris-
oners in Afghanistan and then Iraq, but covertly until the revelations of 
the Abu Ghraib photographs. Nonetheless, the news accounts of John 
Walker Lindh’s capture contained enough information to lead attentive 
people to learn about the torture. A video showed a CIA officer ques-
tioning him, threatening his life, making medical attention contingent 
on confession and information, and news accounts said he had been 
transported naked in a freezing plane to the United States (Doran 2002; 
Stanley 2001). 
Torture is a form of what Mark Brown (2002) called penal excess. 
Brown used the British Empire in nineteenth-century India as his case in 
point. Two examples illustrate: execution by cannon of the Sepoy muti-
neers/revolutionaries of 1857 and a law of the Indian Penal Code of 1871 
criminalizing certain tribes without proof of particular criminal acts.
The execution by cannon was terrorism. It was a spectacle and terrify-
ing retribution to any who would defy British authority. Brown described 
it. One British officer, Sir John Lawrence, wrote “Our object is to make 
an example to terrify others” (Brown 2002:408). Citing Malleson (1897: 
367–368), Brown gave the following quotation of Sir John: “I think suf-
ficient example will then be made. . . . The Sipahis will see that we punish 
to deter, and not for vengeance. . . . [O]therwise they will fight desperately 
to the last” (Brown 2002:409). Brown’s point is to show the modern 
state using penal excess as exemplary punishment. Deterrence relies on 
terrifying spectacle much as modern deterrence uses long prison terms, 
capital punishment, three strikes laws, sexual predator laws, and so on—
a far cry from Cesare Beccaria’s (1764) minimalist brand of punishment: 
to punish only enough to deter.
The next example fits better as analogy with current terror laws, which 
criminalize membership and association along with intention, rather than 
illegal acts. The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 targeted traditional, semino-
madic tribes that fit Hobsbawm’s (1981) definition of bandits—groups 
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opposing central authorities and fitting with social structures to keep 
traditional values and norms. The 1871 Act required tribal registration, 
and confined them to their home villages or forcibly settled them in special 
areas. It resembled the reservation system for American Indians. Three-
time violation of the Act carried a mandatory seven-year prison sentence 
or penal transportation. It precluded the state having to prove guilt for a 
particular criminal act.
Brown makes an explicit comparison. “The members of the USA’s 
underclass represent a contemporary analogue of the ‘suspect’ groups 
brought under the criminal tribes policy in 19th-century India: groups who 
stood outside and in opposition to the new extractive colonial economy” 
(Brown 2002:417). He went on to cite a campaign platform of George W. 
Bush as the governor “of the killing state, Texas” (418). A more precise 
analogy, however, is with U.S. treatment of its native inhabitants in the 
nineteenth century and also with current treatment of outsiders associ-
ated with terrorism. The latter group includes ethnic-religious minorities 
within the United States who are Muslim, Near or Middle Eastern, or 
otherwise associated in collective imagery with such social categories. The 
foregoing description is cumbersome and even vague, because it captures 
a sensibility and set of images and icons instead of discursively defined 
categories. In addition, the 1871 Act and British policy resemble U.S. laws 
and policies about those groups and individuals outside the United States 
who are also associated with terrorism under law. It includes “Al Qaeda,” 
questionably any sort of organization, perhaps a network, but most likely 
merely a movement. The U.S. terror laws target people who fall into these 
categories. Within the United States, they are liable to prosecution and 
imprisonment. Outside U.S. borders, they are subject to assassination or 
imprisonment and torture. 
Another example of imperial policy is that of the British designation of 
the Mau Mau as a terrorist organization in 1950s Kenya. “To define ‘ter-
rorism’ or ‘terrorist acts’ as crimes creates a process of reification which 
may produce undesired and unanticipated consequences. . . . The a priori 
definition of ‘terrorism’ as evil assumes . . . that terrorism is a zero sum 
game” (Anderson-Sherman 1982:87). Arnold Anderson-Sherman traced 
British imperial policy and the Kikuyu’s response, resistance, and adapta-
tions to it. He argued that it was the terror laws themselves that portrayed 
these Kikuyu responses as terrorism, and brought about violent conflict in 
1950s Kenya. He concluded by observing that the British-Kikuyu conflict 
might have been resolved otherwise “what is needed is less reification of 
particularistic self-interest and more adequate diagnosis of the alternative 
possibilities contained within particular historical contexts” (Anderson-
Sherman 1982:99).
92  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
The reification of terrorism and terrorists is analogous to the reifica-
tion of criminality. The U.S. criminal justice system reifies and recursively 
defines crime as something criminals do. Criminals are members of 
subordinate social categories who are redundant to the production and 
profit-making political economy. Criminals, according to these defini-
tions, are also statistically associated with racial minorities. The infamous 
Willie Horton television ads during the 1988 presidential campaign cap-
ture in iconic form these reifying processes. Criminalization processes 
in the 1970s aimed at controlling insurgent masses in the United States 
who threatened the structural stability and social hierarchy. Part of the 
criminalization process molded and manipulated public opinion to redi-
rect fears toward a criminal class and support expansion of state control, 
especially police and corrections. Criminalization of terrorism beginning 
in the 1980s mirrored the criminalization process begun ten years before. 
Terrorism laws built on fertile ground. They combined a well-established 
public fear of the internal-external enemy of communism with a colonial-
ist racism deeply embedded in America’s history. After the attacks of 9/11, 
terror laws and terror fears coincided with a U.S. imperialist thrust into 
central Asia. Those in the way became subject to the terror laws.
Torture had largely disappeared from the U.S. criminal justice system 
by the 1970s, mainly because of U.S. Supreme Court decisions extending 
Bill of Rights restrictions to state governments. Another part of the U.S. 
state went in the other direction. The U.S. military and intelligence appa-
ratuses had been building a covert torture capability since the end of the 
Second World War. First developing modern torture techniques, they then 
exported and taught them as part of Cold War imperialism in the Third 
World. Coming full circle, the CIA has used extraordinary rendition to 
countries practicing torture, often learned from the United States (Grey 
2006). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States had 
techniques and a leadership cadre of torturers in place.
Imperial expansion and invasions brought about a convergence of orga-
nizations, personnel, knowledge, and law to produce the torture regime in 
the United States. It included a public prepared for compliance, personnel 
in police and corrections for deployment in conquered territories, and 
terror laws that, arguably, legitimized torture procedures.
Public Opinion and Torture
The American public may have been prepared for compliance with a 
regime of torture, but the relation between the public and government is 
not a one-way street. In mass societies the relation between public opin-
ion and the government is dialectic. The originator of public relations, 
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Edward L. Bernays, recognized and exploited the phenomenon. According 
to Bernays, shaping public opinion requires constant monitoring, and it is 
always a matter of shaping, not creating (1934, 1955). With the advent of 
universal White suffrage in the United States after the First World War and 
Nineteenth Amendment, racial minorities remained largely excluded until 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, when managing and measuring public opinion 
took on crucial political importance. Polling became a new profession and 
grew increasingly scientific. While never completely capturing what people 
believe, modern poll results reveal a public that interacts with government 
policies and practices.
In her column in The Nation, Patricia Williams (2001 cited in Welch 
2006) referred to a CNN poll taken shortly after 9/11, which showed that 
45 percent of Americans would not object to torture if it provided infor-
mation about terrorism. Public opinion has changed little subsequently. In 
contrast, more than 80 percent of people in Western Europe reject torture 
under any circumstances (Pew 2007:25; World Public Opinion 2008). 
Revelations of torture—including graphic imagery from Abu Ghraib, tele-
vised on 60 Minutes II April 28, 2004—became public in the intervening 
years. Nonetheless, the stability of sentiment suggests a deep-seated view-
point. These data raise several questions. First, why do so many Americans 
accept torture? Second, how do such sentiments fit with democratic 
values? Third, what has been the dynamic between the sentiment and the 
practice of torture by military and intelligence apparatuses?
October 7, 2001, Karl Rove, President George W. Bush’s political guide, 
conveyed a message to him from Roger Ailes. Ailes had been the political 
adviser of the senior Bush, George H. W., and was at the time head of 
FOX News. He told the president that the American public expected their 
president to use “the harshest measures possible. Support would dissipate 
if the public did not see Bush acting harshly” (Woodward 2002: 207). 
The incident reveals a crucial third actor, articulating the relation between 
the government and the people—mass media. The media are more than a 
simple conduit. The media shape and channel public opinion. The govern-
ment relies on the media to build and sustain compliance.
The media designated the attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon as an “attack on America.” The government designed a war 
on terror as its reaction. 
The war on terror . . . is a violent rejection of the unthinkable and intolera-
ble. It is a disgusting revulsion against something (that America calls ‘terror’ 
or ‘evil’) that does not make sense, that was/is still horrifying, that allegedly 
comes from ‘elsewhere’ (although it was and may still be within ‘us’), that 
cannot be identified as a traditional object of geopolitics. . . . As media 
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pundits and intellectuals of statecraft have reminded Americans, the war 
on terror is a different war, with no really distinguishable home and away 
fronts. )
(Debrix 2008:75)
With erasure of a distinction between home and away fronts, an irrational 
revulsion, free-floating fear, and pervasive rage, the government embarked 
on a war against evil. The “attack on America” represented a mystical evil. 
The government called on the people to support a messianic crusade 
(Welch 2006:8). The post-9/11 war on terror resonated with, and built 
on, fear of and war against crime. Just as the crime wars of the preceding 
decades shifted the focus from crime to criminals (Welch 2006:41), so the 
war on terror shifted from the problem of terrorism to evildoers employ-
ing terrorist tactics. “[T]he war on terror is a sustained illusion and mythic 
cleansing—of terrorists, of evil, of our own fear” (Welch 2006:61 citing 
Lifton 2003). In this media-fueled and government-orchestrated cru-
sade, mass psychology turns away from focused, rational anger against a 
threatening enemy—such as the mass anger against Japan following Pearl 
Harbor. Instead, the mass psychology in the age of terror has become nar-
cissistic rage. The government and media turned the attacks of 9/11 into 
attacks against the collective self.
Aggression, when employed in the pursuit of maturely experienced 
causes, is not limitless. However vigorously this aggression is mobilized, 
its aim is limited and definite: the defeat of the enemy who blocks the 
way to a cherished goal. As soon as the aim is reached, the rage is gone.
The narcissistically injured on the other hand, cannot rest until he has 
blotted out a vaguely experienced offender who dared to oppose him, to 
disagree with him, or to outshine him. It can never find rest because it can 
never wipe out the evidence that has contradicted its conviction it is unique 
and perfect. This archaic rage goes on and on and on. Furthermore, the 
enemy who calls forth the archaic rage of the narcissistically vulnerable is 
seen by him not as an autonomous source of impulsions, but as a flaw in a 
narcissistically perceived reality. The enemy is experienced as a recalcitrant 
part of an expanded self over which the narcissistically vulnerable person 
had expected to exercise full control. 
(Wolf 2001:2)
Consider how the mass media might otherwise have designated the 9/11 
attacks. Instead of an “attack on America,” it could have been an attack 
on the command and control center of world capitalism or international 
business and corporations and an attack on the command and control 
center of global militarism or the central U.S. military headquarters. 
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Such constructions would militate against narcissistic rage, and encour-
age reasoned and focused aggressive action. In contrast, the war on terror 
has become endless and global in which any means, including torture, are 
justified.
Darius Rejali identified three uses of torture in democracies: national 
security, civic discipline, and judicial. These uses correspond to the 
three main purposes for governments’ torture: intimidation, coercion, 
and interrogation (2007:22–23). Rejali argued that democracies rely on 
stealthy torture that does not leave marks to hide the torture or at least 
make it deniable. Most techniques used by U.S. military and intelligence 
personnel in the war on terror favor the stealthy type of torture. Stress 
positions, water boarding, and sensory deprivation, for instance, leave no 
marks. There are no images of mangled bodies, and no disfigured torture 
victims to accuse their torturers. 
Americans can accept torture—and even those who reject it are not 
trying to overthrow the government to stop it—because U.S. government 
officials keep assuring the public that America does not torture. “The 
gloves are off,” but the bruises are invisible. The public can know that the 
government is using the “harshest measures possible” without having to 
confront their reality. Mass narcissistic rage can be vented without shame 
or guilt.
Securing Fear through Torture
Torture and terror (and counterterrorism) go together. Historically, ter-
ror legislation and torture have coincided, as in Latin America in the 
1970s and 1980s. Countries that have used torture as part of their justice 
systems—for example Turkey, Syria, China, and so on—also have fairly 
extensive terror laws. In contrast, those countries and political confed-
erations, such as the European Union, that have eschewed reified terror 
legislation, have not employed torture.
The relationship between terror laws and torture is not a simple 
causal relation. One does not cause the other. Both are indicators of state 
control. Moreover, in mass societies such as the United States, commu-
nications media play a crucial role. Government, public consciousness, 
and media produce state policies. Recent U.S. history shows how this 
dialectic resulted in a moral panic (Cohen 2002) about crime in the late 
twentieth century, which overlapped and blended into a moral panic 
about terrorism.
Expansion of state control is a definitive part of imperialism. When 
states embark on imperialist projects, they employ terror legislation and 
torture. Security states, built in response to perceived threats against 
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the social and political order, often use both terror laws and torture. 
Nonetheless, the history of Latin America links antiterrorism crusades 
and torture to U.S. imperialism. The imperialist effect may not include 
the government using torture but the result of imperialist influence by an 
outside force. Racism is also a common, though perhaps not necessary, 
factor. Racism helps to mark social categories as potential terrorists. It also 
promotes the dehumanization and distancing that is so much a part of the 
social psychology of torture. Of course, it is especially central to the U.S. 
case as part of the long history of torture of African Americans and Native 
Americans.
Writing in 1946 in an editorial entitled “The Century of Fear” in the 
once underground newspaper, Combat, Camus explained. 
Our twentieth century is the century of fear. . . . My view, however, is that 
rather than blame our fear, we should regard it as a basic element of the 
situation and try to remedy it.
In order to come to terms with fear, we need to understand what it signi-
fies and what it rejects. It signifies and rejects the same fact: a world in which 
murder is legitimate and human life is considered futile. . . . Before we can 
build anything, we need to ask two questions: “Yes or no, directly or indi-
rectly, do you want to be killed or assaulted? Yes or no, directly or indirectly, 
do you want to kill or assault. 
(Camus 1946:257–259)
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958), Hannah Arendt proffered the 
thesis that aggressive warfare against external foes coincides with totalitar-
ian regimes’ treatment of their domestic population—that is, the regimes 
carry out warfare against both. Michael Stohl, in part, building from 
Arendt’s idea, carried out a historical study comparing domestic violence 
in the United States with states of war in which it participated. He found 
an unmistakable pattern: increased political violence at home accompa-
nies warfare abroad (1976). Repressive political violence against dissenters 
and rebels played handmaiden in the United States during the Vietnam 
War. The U.S. military and intelligence apparatuses used torture and 
facilitated its use by allied South Vietnamese. Police used torture against 
dissident racial minorities in the United States. The case of the Black 
Panthers—accused of a 1973 bank robbery in San Francisco—is but one 
example. Convicted by tortured confessions, a federal court reversed the 
convictions (Algeria et al. 2007). The police surveilled, harassed, and jailed 
White dissidents. They tortured and murdered Black dissidents, as in the 
Cook County State Attorney’s Office murder of Fred Hampton and Mark 
Clark in Chicago, December 4, 1969 (Alk 1971, Eyes on the Prize II:13). 
Torture marks minorities and secures the fear of majorities. 
